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StalkPhish
Thomas Damonneville·(updated 14 October 2022)·3 min read

[Phishing kit] Scammer vs Scammer - backdoored phishing kit

Scammer world should be a hard thug life. A merciless world… with no pity… Some scammers try to steal other ones! What a shameless! During our researches we found one of those ‘backdoored’ phishing kit, let’s have a fast dive into it.

A XBalti kit on a hacked server

As usual our StalkPhish instance (see StalkPhish-OSS) found some kits we check sometimes. This one is a XBalti one which target Chase. Nothing unusual - XBalti phishing kits are quite common unfortunately - until we check a little bit more into the code.

Phishing page imitating the Chase sign-in form over a lakeside photo, with username and password fields

This kit was placed into a hacked server, server which is not very well secured, not secured because scammers took it and because the Apache service allow the OpenDir function, as you can see:

Open directory on the hacked server: Spox_V5_Reloaded.zip, XB4LTIV5.zip, a.php, bots.txt, an en/ folder and hassan1.php

What we checked is XB4LTIV5.zip file (ok, there is a Spox one too, but one thing at a time), which looks like this when you uncompress the zip file:

Content of the XBALTIV5 archive: admin, css, fonts, img, js and rz folders, and an XBALTI folder with Email.php, api.php, index.php and send.php

This zip file contains the Chase phishing kit uncompressed into the en/ directory, whith a XBalti v3 admin panel:

XBALTI V3 admin panel dashboard: counters for viewers, e-mails, SSN and DOB, cards, and a list of visitors with IP, date, browser and country

An obfuscated api.php

But what we found the most interesting into this kit is the use of an obfuscated part of the code, contained into the api.php file:

Content of api.php: a single PHP eval(base64_decode(…)) call with a long encoded string

It is a very light code obfuscation as you can see, because it is base64 encoded in fact… Anyway there is no use of such encoding in other files so why is it there? Let’s check what’s inside:

Decoded api.php: a second call to the Telegram sendMessage API with another bot token and chat id, highlighted

A second exfiltration channel

Seen? Yeah, you got it! There is another exfiltration channel, using the Telegram API (check this blog post to know more about use of Telegram in phishing kits) to send data, as this file (api.php) is loaded into the send.php file to double send the stolen credentials:

Extract of send.php: the XBALTI_MESSAGE function includes api.php with require_once, circled in red

How did the backdoor get there?

Now, how this backdoor came into this phishing kit zip file? Does the code has been re-write using webshell by another actor? Yes, because there is webshell deployed on this box (the hassan1.php we saw before on the opendir screen capture):

“AnonyMous SHell” login page asking for a password

But, wait, it’s password protected! No problem, another actor deployed another webshell without any protection…

Second web shell on the server, an “Alfa Team” Tesla shell showing the server kernel and database modules

¯_ (ツ)_/¯

Anyway, because the backdoor is contained into the zip file, we can think that this kit is ‘armed’ as it is.

Well, it seems that the scammer world is a hard world as we saw, backdoored phishing kits is legion, and scammer’s world is sometimes offended with this, as we can read here and there into scammers forums:

Scammer forum post warning about backdoored scam pages, with the mention of “Chase with XBALTI” circled in red

Hard times we are living…

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